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CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION::
NEWSPAPERS and radio stations,' in response to popular demand, devote a
great deal of space and time to reports of crime, police hunts and trials.
Though a sensational trial may be "good copy," a sensitive judge may see
in lurid accounts and colorful comments a threat to impartial justice." Should
he cite an offending news organ for contempt, the judge will invoke the
constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial.3 The news organ will invoke
in return the constitutional right to free expression.4 When these funda-
* Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied, 18
U.S.L. WEEK 4090 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1950).
1. Although this Note mentions specifically only the press and radio, these do not
exhaust the list of "publications" which have been held in contempt. See, e.g., Ex partc
McMahon, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1514 (K.B.) (newsreels); Ex parle Craig, 282 Fed. 138
(2d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 255 (1923) (private correspondence). There is no reason
to think that the list cannot be extended to include such innovations as television broad-
casts or courthouse picketing.
2. Even where impartial justice is not at stake, publications have been punished for
threatening judicial dignity. See Niles, Contempt of Court by Publieation, 45 TuANSAC-
TIONS MD. STATE BAR Ass'N. 101, 138-44 (1940). The better authority, however, indi.
cates that contempt by publication will not be sustained unless something more than
personal feelings have been hurt. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 372 (1946) (con-
curring opinion) ; Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 281 (1923) (dissenting opinion). Public
opinion does not seem willing to make judicial officers any more immune from personal
criticism than other government officials. See results of Gallup poll, reported in Niles,
supra, at 111.
3. The constitutional right to a fair trial must be granted by state and federal courts
alike. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Exactly what constitutes fair trial, how-
ever, has never been entirely settled: not all the provisions of Amendments Five through
Eight are applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See the discussion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (19,17). But some re-
quirements, such as freedom from mob domination, have been held definitely included in fair
trial. Moore v. Dempsey, supra. While the states are free to work out their own meth-
ods for the administration of criminal law, when a method has been chosen, it is subject to
the prohibition against denial of due process. Ibid. Therefore, although the right to a
jury trial embodied in the Sixth Amendment is not one of the Bill of Rights provisions
binding on the states, when jury trial is guaranteed in a state constitution that state must
insure the fair administration of the system. See the implications of this requirement in
the Baltimore Radio case, note 14 in!ra.
4. The free expression guaranteed in the First Amendment is also protected by the
Fourteenth from impairment by the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925). But if the First Amendment includes only the English common law prohibition
against previous restraints on speech, it may be no bar to contempt punishment after publi-
cation. Recent opinion, however, regards this distinction as specious, and holds that the
First Amendment prohibits all restraints. See CAFFEE, FaR SPmEnc IN TII. UNITED
STATES 9 et seq. (1941).
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mental rights seem to clash head-on, where and on what basis should a line
be drawn?5
In reviewing the use by state courts of "contempt by publication," the Su-
preme Court has developed the following formula: out-of-court publications
can be punished summarily when they constitute a "clear and present danger"
to impartial judgment of pending cases." In no case, however, has the
Court found a danger "clear and present" enough to justify punishment.7
Thus the Supreme Court formula has been called a grant to newspapers
of virtual immunity s rather than a compromise of their historic struggle with
the courts.9
Nevertheless, the actual scope of this immunity has remained somewhat un-
certain. In each of the Supreme Court cases the danger asserted was to judge,
not jury, deliberations.' 0  Although no explicit distinction was made, the
5. The direct and sometimes bewildering nature of the clash was illustrated in the
lower court hearing of the Baltimore Radio case when the American Civil Liberties
Union, supporting free press, found itself arrayed against the Miaryland Civil Liberties
Committee, which supported fair trial. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 54, Baltimore
Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497 (ld. 1949).
6. A case may be "pending" from the time of the issuance of a warrant for arrest (in a
criminal case) or the filing of a complaint (in a civil action) until the final disposition of
a case on appeal. "The decisive consideration is whether the judge or jury is, or presently
will be, pondering a decision that comment seeks to affect." See Pennekamp v. Florida,
spra, at 369 (concurring opinion). See also Ex parte Crqig, 282 Fed. 138, 159-60
(1922) (dissenting opinion).
7. In all the Supreme Court cases the contempt findings of the state courts were
reversed. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (newspaper articles attacking judge during
his repeated refusals to accept jury verdict); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
(articles criticizing judge for throwing out criminal indictments) ; Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941) (telegram and articles calculated to influence judge in determination
of sentence).
8. The construction given "clear and present danger" in the Craig case suggested
that state courts would be prevented entirely from using contempt by publication, as are
the federal courts, see note 26 in ra. See the complaint by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 391 (1947) (dissenting opinion): "Hereafter,
states cannot deal with direct attempts to influence the disposition of a pending contro-
versy by a summary proceeding, except when the misbehavior physically prevents pro-
ceedings from going on in court, or occurs within its immediate proximity." A similar
conclusion was voiced by supporters of the decision. See, e.g., Barth, Freedom from Con-
tempt, Nieman Reports, April, 1949, p. 11. See also, Note, 23 INID. L.J. 192, 203 (1948).
9. The struggle for power between press and judiciary has sometimes been intensified
by their support of opposing sides in important economic issues. See, e.g., Nelles & King,
Contempt by Publication, 28 COL L. REv. 525, 543 (1928), discussing Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) (judicial management of public service corpor-
ations) and the impeachment trial of Judge James H. Peck (land speculation). See also
Ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 255 (1923); Hale,
Public Opinion as Contempt of Court, 58 Amr. L. REv. 481 (1924).
10. See note 7 supra. The judge in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) was a
layman holding temporary appointment rather than a regular member of the judiciary.
The Supreme Court, however, still felt that he was able to resist newspaper influence.
See note 18 infra.
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opinions left room for the inference that the "clear and present danger" test
might have led to different results had jury decisions been threatened, If
jurors could be shown more susceptible to influence than judges, then the
same comment which constituted no danger in the one instance could still
be found a danger in the other.
The judge-jury distinction was advanced for the first time in the recent
case of Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland.11 Three Baltimore radio sta-
tions, describing the capture of a Negro murder suspect, emphasized police
reports of his previous criminal record and his alleged confession.12 The
defendant, claiming the broadcasts made it impossible to find impartial jurors,
elected to waive his right to a jury trial138 Because the defendant found
this necessary, a Baltimore court concluded that the broadcasts were in fact
an interference with fair trial.14 In accordance with a local rule of court,5
11. 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied, 18 U.S.L. WEEX 4090 (U.S. Jan, 9, 1950).
12. "After three days of unrelenting hard work on the part of every man in the de-
partment, the Baltimore police have just broken the Brill murder case-broken it wide
open. Police Commissioner Hamilton R. Atkinson announced only a few moments ago
that a man has been arrested and formally charged with the crime-the brutal and appar-
ently pointless stabbing of eleven-year-old Marsha Brill in the Pimlico neighborhood
Tuesday afternoon. The funeral of the little murder victim was held today and hundreds
of persons attended. The man now charged with the Brill girl's murder is Eugene James,
a 31-year-old Negro and convicted former offender, whose home is . . . not far from the
scene of the crime.
"The police said James not only admitted the Brill murder and another recent assault
in the same area but that he went over the scene of the crime with them late this afternoon
and showed them where the murder weapon was buried. It turned out to be an old
kitchen carving knife. Immediately after the finding of the knife the prisoner was taken
downtown to police headquarters for a formal statement. The story of how James came
to be charged with the Brill murder is an account of police work at its best. James was
taken into custody yesterday mainly because of his record. Police remembered that he
had been charged or suspected in past years with a series of assaults and that about ten
years ago he was sentenced to the Maryland penitentiary for an attack on a ten-year-old
child. . . ." Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497, 500-1 (Md. 1949) (quot-
ing one radio bulletin).
13. This right is guaranteed in MD. CoNsT. Art. V.
14. In re Maryland Broadcasting Co. (Balt. Cr. Ct., 1949), summarized in 17 U.S.L.
WEEx 2381 (Feb. 22, 1949). For fuller quotation of the lower court opinion see Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, 18 U.S.L. WEEx 4090 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1950). Whether the facts
of this case support a conclusion that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial in a con-
stitutional sense is somewhat debatable. Factors which so far have been held to violate
due process have been matters rather obviously prejudicial. See note 3, supra. Here the
Baltimore Court was presented with no affirmative showing that the broadcasts actually
made impartial jury trial impossible: it accepted speculation on this point by defendant's
counsel as conclusive. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 18 U.S.L. W=iuK 4090,
4091 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1950). Furthermore, cross-examination forced the admission that de-
fendant might have waived his jury trial right for other reasons. See Brief for Appellant,
app. pp. 37-8, Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949).
15. Rule 904 of the Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City:
"In connection with any case which may be pending in the Criminal Court of Baltl-
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it cited the three stations for contempt. The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
reversing, held that the decision and the rule under which it was made were
invalid restraints on the freedoms of speech and press.,, Following the
Supreme Court formula, it expressly based its reversal on a finding that no
"clear and present danger" to justice had resulted."1 In so doing, the court
rejected the argument that jurors require more protection from potentially
prejudicial comment than judges.' s
Unfortunately, the Baltimore Radio case did not eliminate the possibility of
a future judge-jury distinction. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in an
unusual opinion disavowing any implication that it approved the Maryland
decision.' 9 The specific refusal to affirm leaves state courts free to decide
more, or in connection with any person charged with crime and in the custody of the
Police.. . whether before or after indictment, any of the following acts shall be subject
to punishment as contempt:
"C. The issuance by the police authorities, the State's Attorney, counsel for the de-
fense, or any other person having official connection with the case, of any statement rela-
tive to the conduct of the accused, statements or admissions made by the accused, or other
matter bearing upon the issues to be tried.
"E. The publication of any matter which may prevent a fair trial, improperly influ-
ence the court or the jury or tend in any manner to interfere with the administration of
justice.
"F. The publication of any matter obtained as a result of violation of this rule."
Full quotation of the rule may be found in Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67
A.2d 497, 505 (Md. 1949). For a history and analysis of the rule, see Niles, supra note 2,
at 134; Sherbow, Contempt of Court by Publication, Broadcast, and Television, 53 Thr.us-
AcTIONs AD. STATE BAR Ass'x. 165 (1948).
16. Only paragraph E of the rule, note 15 supra, was specifically declared unconstitu-
tional. The other paragraphs fell because the court felt they were not severable. 67 A.2d
497,505-6 (Md. 1949).
17. 67 A2d 497, 511 (Md. 1949).
18. "Judges are not so 'angelic' as to render them immune to human influences calcu-
lated to affect the rest of mankind. Conversely, while juries represent a cross-section of
the community, it cannot be denied that in every community there are citizens who by
training and character are capable of the same firmness and impartiality as the judiciary."
Id. at 508-9. The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argued that there were valid grounds
for a distinction between judges and jurors. Id. at 518-21.
19. "The one thing that can be said with certainty about the Court's denial of Mary-
land's petition in this case is that it does not remotely imply approval or disapproval of
what was said by the Court of Appeals of faryland.' Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 18 U.S.L. WE=x 4090, 4092 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1950). Justice Frankfurter's nine-page
opinion, followed by a sixteen-page appendix (see N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1950, p. 6, col. 3)
gave a number of possible reasons for the Court's refusal to grant certiorari, ranging from
"narrowly technical" ones to "pertinent considerations of judicial policy." I8 U.S.L.
Wre 4090, 4092. Which of these reasons was controlling in the present case the opinion
k ept a jealously guarded secret. Perhaps the reasons of "judicial policy" were simply
that the Court was unable to decide the case. In view of the important issue of civil lib-
erties involved, not to mention the need of the press for a definite standard of permissible
reporting, it was certainly worth a try.
1950]
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for themselves what limit the "clear and present danger" test sets on their
power to restrict press comment during jury cases.2 0  Moreover, the opinion,
despite what appears to be a conscientious effort to confound interpretation,"
drops several hints that the Court is now ready to arrest, if not actually reverse,
the previous trend toward newspaper immunity in judge as well as jury
cases.22 In this respect as well, the opinion encourages state courts to revive
summary punishment for comments which raise only the possibility of ob-
structing justice.
23
The real issue, obscured but not avoided by the judge-jury distinction and
the "clear and present danger" test, is whether contempt by publication as
20. But the state courts have no guide in this determination. Justice Frankfurter,
concealing his hand neatly, refused to say whether "either, or neither" the majority or dis-
senting opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals had applied the "clear and present dan-
ger" test correctly. 18 U.S.L. WrEK 4090, 4092. Even in judge trials, none of the previous
decisions indicates what facts, if any, present a danger "clear and present" enough to sup-
port a finding of contempt. See note 7 supra. The ambiguity of the test is so complete
that it affords no real guide even to the Supreme Court (witness its denial of certiorari). In
addition, the test often obscures the real policy considerations involved, See the excellent
analysis in Riesman, Civil Liberties it; a Period of Transition, 3 Pun=xi Poucy 33, 43
(1942) : "[T]he [Supreme] Court takes into account, in addition to the nearness of the
danger, the various factors, including the value of the interests threatened, which an in-
telligent legislator or administrator -would also consider in determining whether to adopt
a measure of repression. The formula of clear and present danger may help . . . to dis-
guise this essentially legislative and administrative task of social judgment under words
that appear more precise than they actually are, but there is always the risk that the
Court, fooled by its own vocabulary or under its protection, may narrow the range of in-
quiry that is required if it is to assist the legislatures in framing an intelligent public
policy." (emphasis added). On "clear and present danger" generally, see MEIICLroEI,
From SPEECH AND ITs R Arror To SFn-GovmNMENT (1948).
21. See notes 19 and 20 supra.
22. The opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter, who has been leader of the Court
minority seeking a rule more restrictive of press comment. This suggests that the death
within the last year of Justices Murphy and Rutledge, strong supporters of newspaper
freedom-see their concurring opinions, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 369 and
370 (1945)-, may have altered the balance of power which in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S,
367 (1947) was only 4 to 3. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, furthermore, quoted at some
length the findings with which the Baltimore Court justified its contempt citation, 18
U.S.L. WEEK, 4090-2, but devoted only a single paragraph to the rationale of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals. Id. at 4092. It referred to the "mutilation and distortion" of
criminal justice by "extraneous influences." Id. at 4093. And it concluded with reference
to the English contempt rule (extremely strict in its suppression of press comment, see
note 23, infra) followed by a lengthy catalogue of British cases. Id. at 4093 et seq.
23. Punishment for possible obstruction is the rule in England, where, once a case is
pending (see note 6 supra) nothing may be published which might tend to prejudice an
impartial trial. 7 HALSBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 280-8 (1909). Compare the support of
the rule in Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARv. L.
REv. 885 (1935) with the misgivings expressed by Laski, Procedure for Constructive
Contempt in England, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1031 (1928). For citation of relevant English
cases, see 18 U.S.L. WEx 4090, 4093 et seq. See also the case of Silvester Bolam, editor
of the London "Daily Mirror," who was sent to jail for three months after publication of
(Vol. 59
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a special category of crime should be permitted at all. The argument for
restricting press comment is strongest in jury trials of criminal cases. In
these the interference of comment with fair trial is asserted to be greatest,2 4
the interference of a restrictive rule with free expression to be least.25 Yet
even here, the federal courts2c and a minority of states2 l leave newsmen free
unless the object of their out-of-court activities is intimidation or violence.2s
confession stories in connection with the Haigh murder case. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
March 26, 1949, p. 1, col. 7.
Even if a rule extremely restrictive of free press has been successful in England, there
is no reason to assume that all, or part of it, could be successfully transplanted to the
United States. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 359 c seq. (1945) (concurring opin-
ion). Differing institutions, traditions, and public attitudes should give pause to even the
most notorious Anglophile. There are also differences in trial procedure in the two
countries which may justify the existence of different rules. See notes 43 and 52 infra.
24. The main assumption behind the judge-jury distinction is the greater suscepti-
bility of jurors to influence. And the result of a biased verdict is more serious in a crimi-
nal case.
25. Jury trials of criminal cases in general raise fewer broad social issues than novr
devolve upon judges. For the increasing social function performed by the latter, and the
consequent need for unrestricted comment on judicial activity, see Seagle, Con tmpt of
Court in 4 Eizcyc. Soc. SCL 302, 307 (1931).
26. Except for misbehavior of its officers or disobedience to its lawful command, a
federal court can punish summarily only for "misbehavior of [a] person in its presence,
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of ju.stice." 4 STAT. 487 (1831), as
amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 3691 (Supp. II 1946) (emphasis added). The italicized
phrase was interpreted literally for some seventy years after passage of the original Act.
See Nelles & King, supra note 9, at 525-43. Then in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), the phrase was given a causal rather than a geographic
construction; that is, punishment was permitted for out-of-court comment whose effect
was felt in court. Finally, in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme
Court restored the literal meaning of the phrase.
27. Contempt by publication seems permanently abolished by statute in New Yorl:,
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. For a compilation of the state laws, see Nelles & King, mipra
note 9, at 554-62. The New York law allows a special exception for the publication of a
"false, or grossly inaccurate report" of a court proceeding. N.Y. JUDIcAnY LAw § 750 (6).
28. 4 STAT. 488 (1831), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. II 1946) : "Whoever
corruptly, or by threats or force.., endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede, any
witness ... or any grand or petit juror.., or . . . corruptly, or by threats or force
. .. influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the
due administration of justice shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.' The terms "obstruct" or "impede," as used in the Act, refer
only to direct acts of violence or menace, disturbing the ordinary functions of the court.
See United States v. Seeley, Fed. Cas. No. 16,248a (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844). The term "in-
fluence" has never been clearly defined, but the Act specifically confines punishment to
influence which is attempted "corruptly, or by threats or force." Thus a newspaper could
be prosecuted under the Act only if it sought to intimidate jurors or cause physical ob-
struction. Presumably, this would never occur as long as a newspaper wnas operating in a
legitimate editorial capacity.
Of course, if newsmen misbehave in the court itself, they are subject to summary
punishment in the same manner as everyone else, see note 26 supra.
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Moreover, offenders are punished not summarily but only after indictment
and trial by jury.29
A contempt rule which punishes for something less than tangible inter-
ference with justice is dangerously vague. It throws upon the would-be
publisher the burden of guessing in advance whether or not his story will
bring down the wrath of the court. Since most newsmen are not noted
for their timidity, this uncertainty by itself may not cause a substantial cur-
tailment of harmless information. But judges are not timid either, and a loose
standard can be easily abusedA0 Judges have sometimes gone to absurd lengths
in warding off fancied dangers to justice: newspapers have been brought to
bar for mentioning by way of warning the criminal record of an escaped
prisoner,3 1 for alluding to a defendant's financial and domestic misfortunes,82
and for stating that a youth had reported the accidental shooting of a play-
mate. 3 Such absurdities are the natural results of a rule which gives com-
pleie discretion to punish for mere threats. The very narration of the bare
circumstances of a crime can hardly avoid mention of some fact that may
ultimately be in issue.34 Carried to its logical extreme, contempt by publica-
tion would allow a news report to state only who had been arrested and for
what crime; or perhaps even this alone might in some circumstances be
considered prejudicial.
3 5
The rule harms the public no less than the press. A general inhibition on
29. See note 26 mpra, and Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure
in "Inferior" Federal Courts, 37 HARv. L. Rzv. 1010, 1037 (1924).
The present federal requirement of indictment and jury trial for contempts com-
mitted by persons out of court was also the requirement of the early common law. See
Fox, THF HisToRY oF CONTExIrr OF CouR (1927).
30. The decision whether or not to punish for contempt is usually that of the same
judge who presided over the trial allegedly endangered by the publication. The tendency
of an appellate court to accept his findings makes a single opinion decisive. See, generally,
Hale, supra note 9, at 494.
31. Davis v. Baillie, [1946] V.L.R. 485, as cited in 21 AusT. L. J. 54 (1947) (news-
paper held in contempt).
32. The court felt this information would arouse public sympathy. -latfield v. Healy,
[1911] 3 A.L.R. 327 (newspaper held in contempt), as cited in Note, Contempt of Court
by Newspapers in England and Canada, 16 CAN. B. REv. 273, 278 (1938).
33. In re A. A. Abell Co. (BaIlt. Cr. Ct. 1947), cited in Sherbow, supra note 15, at
177. Fortunately this was held only a "technical" contempt and no punishment was im-
posed. Other harsh cases are United States v. Sullens, 36 F.2d 230 (SD. Miss. 1929)
(newspaper punished for suggesting that politics, not justice, might determine outcome of
a prosecution) ; Rex v. Editor of New Statesman, [1928] 44 T.L.R. 301 (K.B.) (punish-
ment for suggesting that the religious convictions of a judge influenced his judgment in
suit against birth-control advocate) ; Rex v. Astor, [1913] 30 T.L.R. 10 (K.B.) (punish-
ment for printing together reports of separate civil and criminal proceedings).
34. Newspapers, according to one view, should be made to distinguish between facts
and opinions given by witnesses to a crime. Sherbow, note 15 supra, at 181. Considering
the difficulties encountered by lawyers and judges in making such distinctions, this
suggestion seems rather impractical.
35. "The mere fact of arrest, or indictment, implies that the police believe the accused
[Vol. 59
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criminal reporting would keep from circulation some material vitally needed
by an informed electorate; political and economic issues raised by national
defense, securities, and antitrust laws are now commonly involved in criminal
cases. 38 Furthermore, comment would be prohibited on a whole range of
collateral subjects in which reference to pending criminal cases is necessary
for clarity and completeness. 37 Even in the direct reporting of common law
crimes, where legitimate public interest seems lowest, the elimination of com-
ment would not be an unmixed benefit. Accounts of arrests or confessions
may quiet community anxiety; 38 descriptions of fugitives may safeguard the
public and aid in capture. Most important, unrestricted comment is an im-
portant check on corrupt, inadequate, abusive, or politically dominated police
and judicial authority.39
The harm of repression is hardly cured by the fact that matter published
after a case is no longer pending is not subject to contempt. Modem criminal
prosecutions last for many months, even years, and often result in several
trials on one issue or related issues. When unrestricted comment finally be-
comes permissible, it is of little interest or utility-freedom to publish some-
thing when it no longer matters is no freedom at all.40
to be guilty or that the Grand Jury has found a prima fade case." Baltimore Radio
Show v. Maryland, 67 A2d 497, 511 (Ad. 1949).
36. Some recent illustrations of significant jury trials include the trial of the eleven
Communist leaders for violation of the Smith Act, the criminal prosecution of the
American Tobacco Company on antitrust charges, and the trial of Preston Tucker and
his associates for fraud in management of the Tucker automobile company. In the latter
case, Tucker's counsel moved to cite Collier's and the Reader's Digest for contempt be-
cause they printed articles describing the history of the enterprise. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1949, p. 46, col. 1. However, the existence of the federal rule made the motion little more
than a gesture.
37. A recent case in Pasco, Wash., provides an excellent example. Suit was brought
by a construction company to collect delinquent payments on a home purchase contract.
A series of illustrated newspaper articles criticizing the quality of the homes was su-
pressed on the ground that, although unconnected with the suit, they might influence its
outcome. The restraining order was later dissolved. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1949, p. 3,
col. 4.
Another illustration was offered by novelist Rebecca West, who vras forced by the Eng-
lish contempt rule to abandon a newspaper assignment on anti-Semitic riots in London. "The
plain fact about these disturbances," she wrote, "was that they were highly artificial,
being cooked up .. . to catch the Jewish and anti-Jewish votes for candidates ... at a
by-election that would occur if Air. David Weitzman, the sitting member of Parliament
who was being tried for blackmarket offenses, were found guilty. About this I
could not say one word, since it would be contempt of court to speculate, however in-
directly, on the result of the trial." New Yorker, August 14, 1948, p. 28.
38. See Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497, 511 (Aid. 1949).
39. Publicity may also help to uncover the guilty or exonerate the innocent. See the
examples in Nelles & King, supra note 9, at 549.
40. "Consistent and logical suppression of discussion likely to affect pending cases
would mean ... that some continuing public grievances could never be discussed at all."
Nelles & King, supra note 9, at 550.
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Damage to the public interest in free expression might have some justifica-
tion if contempt by publication were of substantial benefit to the public in-
terest in fair and impartial jury trials. There is no question, of course, but
that press and radio comment has some effect on the operation of the judicial
process.4 1 To the extent that mass media foster mass attitudes, they impair
whatever ability the individual may have to balance law and evidence in a
prejudice-proof atmosphere. More specifically, the release to jurors or poten-
tial jurors of material that may be held inadmissible at trial would seem to
interfere in fact, if not in law,42 with impartial judgment.
Whether press and radio comment can actually alter the outcome of a par-
ticular trial, however, is doubtful. Impartial verdicts formed only on the
basis of courtroom evidence are supposed to be assured by the examination of
jurors,43 instructions from the judge, and, in the last resort, the power to
declare a mistrial. If devices such as these fail to neutralize the predisposi-
tions of jurors, the fault lies not with the press, but with the system as a whole.
Jury reaction to the facts of a case is the result of long conditioning by a
multitude of environmental factors. Press comment makes its strongest im-
pression when conforming to pre-existing stereotypes in the public mind ;44
41. See e.g., TAFT, LAW REFORM 140-70 (1926) ; Robbins, The Hauptnann Trial n
the Light of English Criminal Procedure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935). The Lindbergh ldd-
napping case is often referred to as the most flagrant example of "trial by newspaper,"
The summation for the prosecution contained an ill-disguised attempt to bring inflamed
public opinion to bear upon the jury: "I am not concerned about what the mob is
clamoring for . . . but you can bet your life that if there is a clamor from the people of
this country for this man's conviction I have sufficient faith in the American people to
know that it is their honest belief and conviction that he is a murderer. Otherwise, there
would be no clamor if there is one." Id. at 305. The traditional summary power to
punish in-court contempts may be the most effective way of checking prejudicial pub.
licity in a case such as this. Furthermore, when interest is nationwide, contempt by
publication is inadequate to check prejudice, because out-of-state newspapers cannot be
punished.
42. When evidence that might be inadmissible at trial reaches the jury through the
press, this fact in itself, without a showing of actual prejudice, is not enough to prevent
a trial or vitiate a verdict. Welch v. United States, 135 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910): "If the mere opportunity for prejudice or
corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial
under the conditions of the present day."
43. In contrast to the painstaking process of jury selection employed in the United
States, English practice usually results in swearing in of the first twelve persons. Robbins,
supra note 41, at 303. The absence of a device for weeding out bias at the impanelling
stage may partly explain the severe British restriction on pre-trial newspaper comment,
see note 23 mspra,
44. See LIPPMANN, PtmLc OPIN o 61 (Pelican Books ed. 1946): "For the most
part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already de-
fined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereo-
typed for us by our culture."
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hence it tends to follow, rather than cause bias.4 5 Viewed in this light, the
suppression of news reporting during a trial cannot eliminate prejudice or
even substantially reduce it. Instead it represents a crude attempt to insulate
the jury from the prevailing climate of opinion.40
The effect of inflammatory reporting in large metropolitan communities,
where it is most likely to occur, is especially open to question. The daily
sensations that are repeated to a sophisticated population are seldom remem-
bered,47 nor are they effective in shaping attitudes.1 8 Given large jury lists
and the lack of homogeneity of these communities, it should always be pos-
sible to find twelve persons whose minds have not been poisoned by pre-trial
sensationalism.
The danger of pervasive prejudice is more serious in smaller communi-
ties.4 9 But here there are better remedies than contempt by publication. If
reporting results in actual courtroom obstruction or violence, those respon-
sible can be indicted and punished. 0 For more subtle threats to justice,
45. The "pressure of the audience" is recognized in Co.rtrrnz oN FrEom OF THE
PREss, A FpEE AND RFSPONSIBLE PRnss 57 (1947). When the press attempts to lead
opinion rather than follow, it is often unsuccessful: witness the ineffectiveness of over-
whelmingly Republican newspaper opinion in the last four presidential elections.
46. "You might as well attempt to stop the flowing of the tide, lest it might over-
whelm the temporary hut of the fisherman upon the shore, as to arrest the march of
public opinion in this country, because in its course it might incidentally affect the merits
of a cause depending between individuals." James Buchanan, quoted in Sv,-snuny,
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAns H. PEcx 448 (1333).
47. Judges in these communities find that the continuous succession of sensational
reporting "in the end produces no impression. It is common experience in the most no-
torious cases to meet a succession of talesmen who have read nothing of the matter, and
an even more frequent occurrence is it to encounter those who can recall nothing of what
they have read." People v. Broady, 90 N.Y.S.2d 864, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
48. A public opinion survey taken by Cornelius Du Bois, Inc., vas attached to the
motion of Alger Hiss for change of venue on grounds of newspaper-fostered prejudice in
New York City. 45.1% of New Yorkers questioned said they had formed opinions on
the guilt or innocence of Hiss, compared to only 33.8% of those interviewed in Rutland,
Vt., to which Hiss sought to have his second trial removed. But the survey yielded some
une-xpected results: In New York, 21.8% of those interviewed thought Hiss guilty, 12.1%
thought him innocent; in Rutland, 23.1% thought him guilty, only 5.95 thought him in-
nocent. United States v. Hiss, Affidavit for Change of Venue, Exhibit B. The fact that
less coverage of the case and less anti-Hiss newspaper sentiment occurred in Rutland did
not support the asserted conclusion that trial there would be more fair. Apparently, the
conservative predisposition of Vermonters was more effective in setting public opinion
against Hiss than hostile newspaper publicity in New York. See notes 44 and 45 supra.
49. The most frequent opportunities for newspapers to mobilize sentiment against an
accused occur in small southern communities when a Negro is defendanL For a recent
example, see Press Performnce and Justice, American Newspaper Guild Reporter, Sept.
23, 1949, p. 10, col. 2. If community prejudice is really widespread, it may reach the
judge. In such a case, contempt by publication would probably be of no use anyway-the
judge could decline to use it.
50. All states have laws, similar to that in the federal courts, against intimidation of
jurors or witnesses, or direct incitement to violence. See note 28 .supra.
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change of venue can be employed.51 The reach of the press and the radio is
rarely so wide that no community can be found where a fair trial is possible.
Even if the evils of news reporting were more real than imaginary, con-
tempt by publication would not be an effective antidote. Prior convictions,
confessions, or other allegedly prejudicial material which the rule seeks to
suppress often come into evidence through authorized trial procedure.5 2 The
object of the rule is further frustrated by the well-established right to report
preliminary hearings, trial proceedings, and disposition of cases on appeal."3
These reports of judicial activity often do the most to form attitudes toward
a defendant. Details of an earlier trial linger in the minds of jurors called
upon to try another case involving the same defendant. Little will be gained
by suppressing facts during the subsequent trial that already have become
matters of public record or common knowledge.5 4
One source of outside pressure on jury trials can be eliminated, how-
ever-the release of facts and opinions, before or during litigation, by
51. Judges have recognized that the probability of all-pervasive prejudice tends to
vary inversely with the size of the community-and have acted accordingly. E.g.,
People v. Broady, 90 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (trial in metropolitan New York,
change of venue denied) ; People v. Fernandez, 89 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (trial in
Nassau County, change of venue granted).
52. This actually happened in the Baltimore Radio case. See Baltimore Radio Show
v. Maryland, 67 A2d 497, 504 (Md. 1949).
The American juror who reads of a confession in the press is usually more cynical
as to its validity and more likely to learn of it eventually in court than his English counter-
part. This results from the fact that the rules for admission of a confession in evidence
are far more strict in England than America, and from the fact that the role of the police
in obtaining confessions is more rigidly circumscribed. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 290 cI scq.
(3d ed. 1940). These differences in procedure may help explain why Britain feels the
need for more severe restriction of confession disclosures by the press. See notes 23 and
43 supra.
53. This fact was recognized in the lower court hearing of the Baltimore Radio case,
but was disposed of rather glibly: "We have pointed out that there can be published or
broadcast, after a preliminary hearing, those matters developed at the preliminary hearing,
including the admission of a confession; and that information then published could be au
disastrous to a defendant as was the publication here before the preliminary hearing.
Gentlemen, that is one of the respects in which the right of the defendant must yield to the
paramount right to make available to the public the court proceedings." See Brief for
Appellant, app. pp. 67-8. The distinction between the right to make court proceedings
available to the public and the right to report the background of these proceedings is not
so obvious as to justify labelling the first, but not the second, a "paramount right."
54. Two other factors point up the futility of contempt by publication as a method for
keeping allegedly prejudicial material from the jury. The first is the inability of state
courts to control out-of-state media of communication. Thus in the Baltimore Radio case
the lower court was powerless to do anything about reports reaching Baltimore front
newspapers and radio stations in Washington, D.C. The second factor is the possibility
of rumor replacing the silenced media as an agent of communication. Circulation of
distorted reports by word-of-mouth presents an even greater possibility of jury prejudice.
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police,55 parties,50 attorneys5 7 and jurors5 8  Here again, the best preventive
is not contempt by publication, which strikes only at the media of communica-
tion, but rather the traditional summary power, employed against the persons
who directly offend the court by releasing objectionable material. 9  If prej-
udicial reports do in fact threaten jury trials, then this remedy has the ad-
vantage of cutting the worst of them off at their source. It also entails less
danger to free speech, because it disciplines those who owe an implied duty
of silence, rather than those who only repeat public statements.c.
There seems to be no justification, then, for punishing press and radio
reports unless they actually cause intimidation or violence. In most situations,
contempt by publication contributes little to a fair trial. Where it could have
a beneficial effect, there are better measures available as substitutes.0 '
55. The trading by police of confidential information in return for favorable news-
paper publicity has become increasingly frequent It seems to have occurred in the
Baltimore Radio case, see note 12 supra. See also Niles, Mupra note 2, at 144. The first step
to correct this practice can be taken within the police department itself. The second,
summary punishment, can be used as a last resort and justified on the ground that police
are court officers who owe a duty to obey judicial commands. See Rule 904(C) of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, note 15 upra.
56. The recent advertising campaign carried on by the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
defendant in a civil antitrust action, seems a frank attempt made by a party to affect the
outcome of litigation. Perhaps advertising of this nature in a criminal jury trial should
be prevented by the threat of summary punishment.
57. The most objectionable aspects of the Hauptmann Trial might have been avoided
had counsel for state and defense not been permitted to argue their respective cases to
the press--disclosing evidence, legal issues, and future strategy. See Robbins, supra note 41.
58. Release of jurors' opinions after a case can also be prejudicial if a re-trial is neces-
sary. Thus it was unfortunate that the members of the jury in the first Hiss trial were
permitted to tell the press not only how they voted, but what they thought of one another;
for example, "the foreman vwas emotional, two were blockheads and one was a dope."
N.Y. Journal-American, July 9, 1949. Some even went so far as to express their opinions
on the judge's evidentiary rulings. Five Hiss Jurors Express Belief Kaufman was
Biased for Defense, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, July 12, 1949, p. 1, col. 7.
59. Paragraph C of the Baltimore Criminal Court Rule sought to achieve this result.
See notes 15 and 16 supra. Even in the absence of an express rule, it should be possible
for a judge to punish summarily any participant in litigation who violates reasonable
instructions as to permissible disclosures, such as an order to the jury not to discuss its
verdict with the press.
60. This method, by preserving the maximum amount of free speech and fair trial,
seems most in accord with the injunction of Chief Justice Marshall: "so to construe the
constitution as to give effect to [conflicting] provisions, as far as it is possible to reconcile
them, and not to permit their seeming repugnancy to destroy each other." Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 6 Wheat. 264,393 (U.S. 1821).
Cf. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375 (1947) (referring to newspaper articles which
quoted anti-judge resolutions of a citizens' group) : "Whatever may be the responsibility
of the group which [promulgated the resolutions], those who reported it stand in a differ-
ent position. Even if the former were guilty of contempt, freedom of the press may not
be denied a newspaper which brings their conduct to the public eye."
61. If the previous analysis has been correct, the abolition of contempt by publication
can admit of no exception. There is little merit, for example, in the suggestion that some
19501
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The Supreme Court, instead of temporizing, should make the federal con-
tempt rule binding on the states. 2 Then newsmen, like others persons, will
be guaranteed a jury trial for out-of-court activities alleged to be illegal, and
the standard of guilt will be a concrete one of direct and tangible obstruc-
tion. 3 This approach would be more in accord with a constitutional tradi-
tion that has long protected the public interest in free expression,
4
power be retained to prevent the "worst" kinds of press and radio disclosures (presumably
confession reports in crimes of violence). Such advance classification of permissible and
non-permissible reporting offends even the "clear and present danger" test. No class of
comment is so intrinsically harmful that in all circumstances its value as public infornia-
tion is outweighed by the injury it does to fair trial. Even supporters of restriction
recognize the futility of banning only one particular class of comment. See Niles, supra
note 2, at 136 (referring to Baltimore Rule) : "The prohibition of publication of accounts
of the conduct of the accused, forecasts of the future course of action of either side in the
case, or 'other matter bearing upon the issues to be tried,' is simply an itemization of less
obviously prejudicial publications than reports of actual confessions."
62. The federal contempt rule as now interpreted, see note 26 supra, not only reflects
the better social policy-it is held by some to be demanded by the language of the Con-
stitution itself. If this view is correct, then the abolition of summary punishment for out-
of-court publications is not only desirable but mandatory for state courts. See note 4
supra. Strong support for this contention may be found in Nelles & King, sllpra note 9,
at 533: "The [federal contempt statute] was more than a legislative election as to Federal
policy. It expressed a decision of the whole people upon an issue of sovereignty which
had arisen between them and some of their judicial ministers. It responded to an almost
universal conviction as to the nature of our institutions. If freedom was a fact of Ameri-
can life as well as an ornament of patriotic declamation, a discretionary power of judges
to annex society at large to the judicial precincts and curtail outside expressions of
human interests because such expressions might affect a pending law suit was more than
inexpedient. It was impossible. The supposed English common law power, being in-
applicable to American conditions, could have no status in) any American jurisdiction."
(emphasis added).
63. See note 28 supra.
64. "Yellow journalism" is as old as the Constitution itself, and the reason for per-
mitting it is still the same one emphasized by Thomas Jefferson: "I deplore . . . the
putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and
the mendacious spirit of those who write them. . . .These ordures are rapidly depraving
the public taste. It is, however, an evil for which there is no remedy; our liberty depends
on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." Quoted in
PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON 150-51 (1943). Compare the statement of Justice Rutledge
in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371-2 (1946) (concurring opinion) : "There must
be some room for misstatement of fact, as well as for misjudgment, if the press and others
are to function as critical agencies in our democracy concerning [the] courts as for all
instruments of government."
No one questions the evil of sensationalism. The recent preoccupation of the Ameri-
can press with the commission of sex crimes may even be cause for alarm. Intelligent
newsmen are the first to realize that by reporting criminal activity with "zestful disap-
proval" the press and radio may well contribute to its increase. See John Crosby, Is Sex
Necessary, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec. 9, 1949, p. 21, col. 7. But the evil is not one which
can be corrected by sporadic judicial censorship. Good journalism will never be achieved
by threats or legislation; it will come only with public education and reform within the




AMORTIZABLE PREMIUM ON CONVERTIBLE BONDS: THE
SPECULATOR SEEKS A TAX LOOPHOLE*
WHEN a bond is bought for more than its face value, the purchaser may
treat the transaction in one of two ways for accounting purposes. He may
consider the premium as an expense of earning income and deduct a pro rata
share of the total premium from the yearly interest earned by the bond.' Or
he may consider the premium as being added to the permanent cost of the
bond, so that when he redeems the bond at par, he realizes a capital loss. The
former method will give a more accurate picture of the holder's earnings
during the life of the bond, because it recognizes that the interest income is
really not received free and clear but was bought at a price-the excess of
the purchase price over face value. Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code
recognizes this preferable accounting practice by permitting an annual income
deduction for "amortizable bond premium."
While the statute sanctions any reasonable method of amortization which
the holder of the bond has regularly employed,2 it leaves "amortizable bond
premium" undefined. Usually a purchaser will pay a premium in order to
obtain a superior investment yield. But this is not the only reason premiums
are paid. Many bonds are convertible into stock. These convertible bonds
carry conversion features which might give them speculative value. The pur-
chaser of these bonds is paying not for the investment yield but for the specu-
lative features. Unfortunately, Section 125 makes no effort to distinguish
between investment premium and speculative premium.3
Because no distinction is made, the prospective tax consequences under
Section 125 are different for the two types of premium, and this difference
can be extremely important where the bonds are callable. A purchaser of
speculative premium in effect purchases stock. Convertibility ties the market
value of the bond to high stock prices. Unlike normal investment premium,
*Commissioner v. Korell, 176 F2d 152 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Commissioner v. Shoong,
177 F2d 131 (9th Cir. 1949).
1. This technique, called amortization, is a familiar one, similar to the treatment of
depredation charges. By this method the entire premium has been recovered by maturity
and no capital loss is suffered when the bond is redeemed at its nominal value. See PAroi ,
AccoUNTANTS' HANDBOOX 947 et seq. (3d ed. 1943); Moxrcom.avy, AuDrrnmo TEony
ANP.cncrcE 201-202 (6th ed. 1940).
2. The Treasury recognizes methods of amortization required for purposes other
than taxation. Thus, "A taxpayer who regularly employs a method of amortization may
be one, for example who is subject to the jurisdiction of a State or Federal regulatory
agency and who, for the purposes of such agency, amortizes the bond premium on his
bonds in accordance with a method prescribed or approved by such agency... Y" U.S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.125-3 (1943).
3. Premium may be paid either for superior yield or for conversion features which
give the bond speculative value, but not for both. No element of speculative premium is
attributable to superior investment qualities. A purchaser will never pay more for the
bond than the present price of the stock into which it is convertible, less the cost of con-
version. See note 4 infra.
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therefore, speculative premium does not automatically decline as the bond
approaches maturity.4 If the convertible bond is callable on short notice, the
bondholder may deduct his entire premium expense from income immedi-
ately.5 After taking this premium deduction out of earnings taxable as or-
dinary income, he may resell his bond after six months and report the amount
of premium he then receives as a long-term capital gain,0 escaping the higher
4. An illustrative example of speculative bond behavior and the problems confront-
ing the holder is given in GROsSMAN, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRAcTicr 34-5
(1939) : In November, 1935, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company issued $15,000,000
of $1000, 4% convertible debentures, due 1945 at face value. They were convertible into
the common stock of the company at an exchange rate of $35 per share, ie., each $1000
bond was exchangeable for 28.57 shares of stock. At the time of issue the stock was
selling on the New York Stock Exchange at about $35 per share, but shortly thereafter
it began a substantial advance and in March, 1936, it sold at $45, an increase of 287.
This automatically made the price of the bonds advance proportionately to 128, or about
$1285 per $1000 bond ($1285.65 is the value of 28.57 shares of stock worth $45 each).
"What was the bondholder to do at this point? It was clear that the future market
behavior of his bond would be determined by the action of the stock and the bond investor
had, in effect, become a stock market speculator. Later, the stock advanced further and
the bonds advanced as high as 219." A similar example is provided in FLYNN, Stcunn-r
SPECULATION 37-8 (1934). The positions of a stock speculator and a convertible bond
speculator are dissimilar only in that the latter is assured of a floor beneath his specu-
lative purchase; his investment will never decline below the bond's redemption value.
On investment and speculative bonds in general, see, in addition to FLYNN and
GROSSMAN, supra, CHAMBERLAIN, TnE PRINcIPLES OF BOND INVESTMENT §§ 350, 351
(4th ed. 1911) ; Edwards, Bonds in 2 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 634 (1930); Edie, Investinent, in
8 id. 263 (1932); Hardy, Speculation in 14 id. 288 (1934).
As advancing stock prices alter the character of the bond from an investment to a
speculative security, the terms of the conversion contract, for all practical purposes,
change also. Where an issue is callable, the action of the obligor actually determines
whether the conversion option will be exercised-even though the express terms of the
indenture place the option solely with the holder. Thus, if the market price of the bond
is above what its investment merit would ordinarily dictate and the issuing corporation
decides to call the bonds, the effect of that call will be to force the holder to convert in
order to salvage that portion of his capital, represented by the premium he paid, which
would be lost if the bond were redeemed at its nominal value. This transfer of the option
to convert from holder to obligor would seem to remove bonds in such a situation from
the intended scope of the statute. The legislative reports clearly demonstrate that bonds
come within § 125 only "if the option to convert the bond into stock rests with the owner
of the bond. . " H.R. RPa,. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess, 80 (1942), 1942-2 Cum.
BULL. 372, 433-4; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1942), 1942-2 Cum.
BULL. 504, 576.
5. In accordance with the stipulation of § 125(b) (1) that the amount of premium
"shall be determined with reference . . . to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier
call date," U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.125-5 (1943) provides that "in the case of a call-
able bond the earlier call date will be considered as the maturity date" for tie purposes
of determining the period over which amortization is to be spread.
6. By way of illustration: if a $100 short-call bond is purchased at $140, the pur-
chaser will immediately amortize the entire $40 and deduct it from ordinary income.
Upon subsequent resale for $140 (assuming no change in price) six months later, he will
report $40 as capital gain. The efficacy of this device depends on stable or rising stock
prices. The market aspects are discussed in 63 HARv. L. REv. 171 (1949).
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tax on ordinary income. If he converts his holding into stock, the same tax
result will follow: the amortized bond premium has been deducted from in-
come; there is no tax on conversion,7 and only a capital gains tax is paid on
the sale of stock held for six months.
The purchaser of normal premium, on the other hand, gets no similar tax
advantage from short call bonds. If the bond is callable at an early date, it
will bear no more than a small premium because there is the danger that in-
terest payments before the call date will not be sufficient to make up the pre-
mium. And even though the buyer pays a small premium and deducts it as
an expense immediately, there is only a negligible probability of resale after
six months at sufficient profit to make significant the conversion of ordinary
income into a capital gain.8
The Code's* failure specifically to distinguish speculative from investment
premium has precipitated a conflict between the second and ninth circuits.0
Similar cases arising under the section involved three per cent convertible
debentures of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, callable on
30 days' notice. The conversion option was exercisable at any time, the
holder to surrender one bond and pay $40 for each share of stock desired.
The bonds were purchased at an abnormally high premium and, significantly,
at almost exactly $40 below the market price of the common stock into which
they were convertible. The price correlation was apparent. Both taxpayers
claimed large deductions for amortizable premium under Treasury Regula-
tions permitting immediate amortization of the entire premium paid on bonds
.callable on short notice.' 0 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed
both claims.'
7. The exercise of a conversion option is recognized by the Commissioner as an
exception for exchanges in kind under § 112 (a) of the Code. The following was in
Article 1563 of Regulation 45 (1920 ed.): 'Vhere the owner of a bond exercises the
right ... of converting ... into stock in the obligor corporation, such transaction dqes
not result in a realization of profit or loss, the transaction not being cosed... until
such stock is sold." Although long since superseded by later Regulations, this statement
has been held applicable under later acts by a series of Treasury rulings: Mns. 3156,
11-2 CuA. Bum. 24 (1923); I.T. 2216, IV-2 id. 19 (1925); I.T. 2347, VI-1 id. 86
(1927); G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 id. 101 (1937).
8. In its effect on investment premium, an early call date acts as a maturity date.
Since the prospective total yield to maturity is the controlling factor, the ordinary bond
will sell at a negligible premium as maturity, or the call date, draws near. Thus, if the
non-convertible bond is called, the purchaser will have no opportunity to resell and enjoy
"bootleg" capital gains. In the case of a convertible bondholder, however, calling simply
forces conversion, and the fictional capital gain will follow as before on resale of his
holdings, now in the form of stock.
9. Commissioner v. Korell, 176 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Shoong,
177 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1949).
10. See note 5 supra. The taxpayer's method of computation-anortzing the whole
amount of premium over a 31-day period because the bonds were callable on 30 days'
notice-was not challenged by the Commissioner. If the deduction were to be allowed
there was no dispute as to the correct amount.
11. The Commissioner was overruled by the Tax Court. Korell v. Commissioner 1(Q
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In Commissioner v. Korell,12 the second circuit allowed the deduction. Al-
though the court agreed that the premium had not been paid for a superior
investment yield, it found nothing in the statute to justify limiting the deduc-
tion to investment premium.
In Commissioner v. Shoong,'3 the ninth circuit adopted what it considered
the obvious policy of Congress and disallowed the deduction. Extracting
congressional policy from the act and its legislative history, the court but-
tressed its holding with the principle that deductions are to be construed
strictly against the taxpayer.
The amendment's legislative history amply supports the ninth circuit's
holding. Until 1942, the Internal Revenue Code required bondholders to de-
duct premium as a capital loss upon redemption, denying them the more fa-
vorable deduction of an expense out of current income.14 The adoption of
Section 125 was instigated by a Treasury proposal which sought to correct
this unfair tax treatment of bondholders by bringing the Code into line with
sound accounting practice. The Treasury, however, evinced no concern with
purely speculative bond transactions. Mr. Randolph Paul, Tax Advisor to
the Secretary of the Treasury, explained to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee the unfortunate tax position of bondholders who were taxed as though
premium were a capital loss when actually it represented a reduction of in-
come. His remarks can be applied only to investors, who are concerned with
the problems of conserving the capital which yields their income in the form
of interest.'5
T.C. 1001 (1948); Shoong v. Commissioner, 7 CCH, TAx CouRT DEc. 367 (T.C,1,M.
1948), P-H 1948 TC Mrx. mw.D 48,095 (1948).
12, 176 F2d 152 (2d Cir. 1949).
13. 177 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1949).
14. "Under existing law, bond premium is treated as capital loss, sustained by the
owner of the bond at the time of disposition or maturity and periodical payments on the
bond at the nominal or coupon rate are treated in full as interest. The want of statutory
recognition of the sound accounting practice of amortizing premium leads to incorrect tax
results which in many instances are so serious that provision should be made for their
avoidance." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1942); 1942-2 Cum. BULL
372, 410. To the same effect is the statement of Randolph Paul, then Tax Advisor to the
Secretary of the Treasury, infra note 15.
15. Mr. Paul's statement, which follows, indicates that the purposes of the recom-
mended amendment were (1) to deprive holders of tax-free bonds of a tax windfall, and
(2) to relieve other bondholders of an inequitable tax burden. In both cases, the prob-
lem dealt with was the relation between taxation and income production:
"(d) Amortization of bond premihm. Holders of a tax-exempt security purchased at
a premium are today in the unique position of being relieved of tax on the interest paid
on the security and of receiving a deductible loss upon redemption or other disposition of
the security to the extent of the premium. As the premium at which a bond is obtained
represents to the holder merely an effective yield lower than the actual interest rate, the
holder is entitled to tax exemption solely with respect to such effective yield. The dif-
ference between the yield and the actual interest rate is simply a return of capital and
should be treated as such rather than as a capital loss. On the other hand, the holder of
a taxable security purchased at a premium is in the unfortunate position of being taxed
[Vol. 59
NOTES
Considerations quite apart from prospective interest yield guide a pur-
chaser who-like taxpayers Korell and Shoong-offers a high premium for a
bond whose value is hitched by a conversion option to climbing stock prices.
He in effect purchases stock and calculates his capital risk by the probabilities
of subsequent fluctuations in the price of the stock." In recognition of these
economic differences, commercial usage treats investment bonds and specu-
lative convertible bonds as separate species of securities.1 7 Consequently, the
presumption arises that deductions for speculative premium were neither
anticipated nor intended to be covered by Section 125. This presumption,
moreover, is corroborated by the legislative committee reports,18 which
duplicate the tenor of Mr. Paul's statement, and by survival of the substance
of the Treasury proposal in final legislation.
The actual wording of the section may also indicate that the interest factor
alone was meant to be significant in the operation of the law, since the section
classifies bonds solely with reference to the type of interest they bear.10 The
second circuit conceded that the disputed convertible bond premium bore no
relation to the interest factor.2 0 The ninth circuit, entertaining the same view,
upon the interest at high rates and of receiving a capital loss upon redemption whose
deductibility is subject to the restrictions placed upon capital losses. Since the yield
rather than the actual interest reflects the true income to the taxpayer, only that income
should be subject to tax and the capital loss should disappear.
"Proper tax treatment in both situations may be obtained through amortization of
the premium. It is suggested that such amortization be mandatory for wholly tax-exempt
securities and for partially tax-exempt securities held by a corporation. For all other
securities the amortization should be at the taxpayer's election." 1 Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90
(1942). The statement is reprinted in full in the opinion of the ninth circuit, 177 F2d
131, 134. In a recent communication to the YAm LAw JouxmzAz, Mr. Paul confirms that
his congressional statement was limited to problems of income production; he suggests,
however, that others in the Treasury Department may without his knowledge have con-
sidered the broader problem at that time. Communication to the Y&zm LAv JouNAN,
Jan. 6, 1950, in Yale Law Library.
16. CuAmnmuINr, THE Pa mc's.s oF BoxiD INVESTh!ENT c. 2, Gambling, Speecda-
tion and Investment (4th ed. 1911). See note 4 .spra.
17. See FLYNN, SECunny SPEcuLATioN 34-8 (1934):
"An exception to this [that almost all security speculation takes place in common
stock] is a type of bond known as a convertible bond.... Such bonds ... partake of
the nature of common stocks also and are often the subject of wild trading.. . ." Id. at
35. "[T]hese bonds are closely bound up in the fluctuations and speculative operations of
the common stock. They are really not true bonds.' Id. at 38. Similar distinction between
ordinary and convertible, or speculative, bonds is made in BAusoN, INwYsT! E T Furw.A-
emErALs 47, 226 (Rev. ed. 1933); BmaDGE, INvErSTME PrCIPxLS AND PRAccas 1S-
205 (1928); GapxHA. & DoDD, SEcunRrv ANA.Ysis 57-63, 237-93 (1934). See also
note 4 supra.
18. H.IL REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1942), 1942-2 Cu. Buu.. 372,
433; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1942), 1942-2 Ct. Buss. 504, 574.
19. IxT. REv. CODE § 125 (a).
20. 176 F.2d 152, 153, 154.
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found it impossible to justify the application of the section to such premium,2'
The deduction allowed by the second circuit is inconsistent with other de-
ductions provided in the Code. Those deductions are usually expenses in-
curred for the production of income. The premiums paid by taxpayers Iorell
and Shoong were not used to produce income; rather, they represent the pur-
chase price of a speculative asset, and nowhere else does the Code permit de-
ductions for such purchases.
2 2
Admittedly, the lack of precision in the statute may be attributable to leg-
islative oversight. But despite the second circuit's superficially plausible
argument that only the legislature should correct its own errors and supply
its own omissions, 23 there is ample authority for the ninth circuit's restrictive
interpretation of congressional intent. The rule that deductions are acts of
legislative grace and should be construed against the taxpayer 2' is custom-
tailored for this situation: general tax laws need its support to withstand the
attacks of ingenious evasion. This rule alone should resolve the issue in favor
of the Commissioner in the Korell and Shoong cases, particularly since the
legislative history of the act seems clear and unambiguous.
2 5
21. 177 F.2d 131, 134.
22. INT. REv. CODE § 23.
23. 176 F2d 152, 155. The court's rationale apparently rests on the assumption that
to interpret congressional intent one way is to legislate, but to interpret it in another way
is not. Since the legislators failed to define "amortizable bond premum," the problem is
one of determining the meaning of the term. If that determination involves an invasion of
the legislative process, it is an invasion no matter which meaning the court chooses to
endorse.
Although the second circuit dismissed the government's argument which was based
6n legislative history, note 25 infra, it did rely on one isolated aspect of congressional his-
iory to support its own position. Convertible bonds had been mentioned in the Senate and
House reports, see note 4 .sipra, and the second circuit erroneously considered this refer-
ence as an indication that speculative premium was intended to be covered by the deduc-
tion. 176 F.2d 152, 154. The ninth circuit pointed out, however, that the reports merely
indicated that amortizable bond premium on convertible bonds was covered by the section.
Neither the reports nor the statute defined amortizable bond premium, and, in the ninth
circuit's view, the second circuit was incorrect in disregarding other aspects of congres-
sional history which indicated that only investment premium and not speculative premium
was meant to be covered by the phrase "amortizable bond premium." 177 F.2d 131, 135.
24. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934): "Whether and to
what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there
is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed. . . ." See also Hel-
vering v. Northwest Steel Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940) ; Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488,
493 (1940); White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
25. The second circuit's summary dismissal of this feature of the controversy is per-
haps the most unsatisfactory aspect of its decision. 176 F.2d 152, 154. The court rested
its dismissal on the authority of Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945). The inap-
propriateness of the Walling case to the present situation is apparent in the following
passage from that source. It reveals a totally different problem of statutory interpreta-
tion:
"The argument from the legislative history undertakes, in effect, to contradict the
terms of § 8(f) by negative inferences drawn from inconclusive events octurring fi the
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Finally, judicial overcaution would here perpetuate an admitted loophole
that may very easily, as the second circuit agreed, cause this device to become
the "rage of the security markets."'2 With these compelling circumstances to
recommend it, the result reached in the ninth circuit merits the approval of
the Supreme Court.
2 7
course of consideration of the various and widely differing bills which finally, by com-
promise and adjustment between the two Houses of Congress, emerged from the confer-
ence as the Act. The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a leg-
islative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly am-
biguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction. This is
such a case."
By comparison, the legislative history of § 125 is particularly neat, revealing a single
bill proceeding from Treasury proposal through committee reports without controversy,
compromise, or adjustment.
A similar misuse of authority characterizes the court's denial of the Commissioner's
petition for rehearing, 176 F.2d 152, 155. Not only does the summary rejection of the
government's "scholarly accountant's concept" fly in the face of the specific Congressional
invocation of "sound accounting practice," see R.R. Ir',. No. 2333, note 14 supra, but the
court's assertion that dissatisfaction with that concept underlay the rejection of amortiza-
tion in § 6 of the UNIFORM PRINciPAL AND IxcomE AcT (regulation of estate trust ad-
ministration) is also unwarranted. 176 F.2d 152, 155. Actually, amortization of premium
was rejected in the Uniform Act primarily, if not entirely, for reasons of mere administra-
tive convenience. See 39 HANDBN. NAT. CoNF. Co-m&'RS ON UNIFRM STATE LAWS 290-
92 (1929); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND IxcomE Acr: REAsoNs ror rrs Anornon 4, 6-7
(1933) ; 34 Mica. L. REv. 448, 451 n.12 (1931). The court's view that the assumption
supporting amortization is a fiction, 176 F.2d 152, 155 n.1, suggests that its rejection of
the Commissioner's contention is in effect a rejection of the judgment of Congress that
amortization is a sound policy and should be incorporated in the tax law.
26. The second circuit frankly acknowledged the loophole:
"We shall avoid the [Commissioner's] charge of naivet6 by expressing no dissent;
whatever respondent may actually have done with these bonds after 1944, it certainly
would be perfectly normal to expect a holder to sell them in due course after the proper
interval to take advantage of the lower rates for capital gains. And the obvious advan-
tage, taxwise, of transactions of this form might make such convertible bonds all the rage
of security markets. Nevertheless the difficulties of a judicial attempt to remodel legis-
lation to deal with such a situation at once fairly and not overdestructively remain ob-
vious." 176 F2d 152, 153-4.
In striking contrast is the more practical philosophy expressed by Judge McCord,
dissenting, in Farkas v. Commissioner, 170 F2d 201, 205-6 (5th Cir. 1948) :
"I am well aware that it is not the function of courts, by judicial fiat, to attempt
enactment of remedial tax legislation. I am further aware that every taxpayer has a
constitutional privilege to minimize his tax liability through lawful tax avoidance. Nev-
ertheless, I have never favored decisions which encourage loopholes in our tax< law.s and
enable taxpayers . . . to transfer excess income and thereby retreat to lower tax brackets
during prosperous and high tax years, and later to retrieve that same source of income
in lean years, when income taxes are usually much lower." While the issue in the Farkas
case was substantially different (grantor's liability for tax on the income of a ten-year
trust), the type of problem facing the court was essentially the same.
27. Commissioner v. Korell was argued before the Supreme Court, Feb. 7, 1950. 18
U.S.L. W Ka 3232. The taxpayer's petition "for certiorari in Shoong v. Commissioner,
filed Nov. 12, 1949, is pending. 18id. 3158.
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